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I. INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In its role of Developing Agency for Naval aircraft weapons
systems, including airframes, avionics equipment, the Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) must maintain the capability to conduct
test and evaluation (T&E) of the equipment it is developing.
This has been accomplished through the establishment and develop-
ment of a group of T&E field activities with differing responsi-
bilities for the various areas of interest for which NAVAIR
requires testing. The role of the T&E field activities is to
provide the various groups at NAVAIR Headquarters with the
testing services necessary to ensure that the various developmental
programs are progressing satisfactorily and that they have a
reasonable probability of success. Also, Information must be
provided to allow for correction of deficiencies as early as
possible, particularly in advance of expensive production
decisions. Testing after a production decision provides a form
of quality assurance and helps to identify areas requiring
further correction.
Managing the operation of the field activities, internally
and at the Headquarters level, in the current environment of
weapon system acquisition is complex and difficult. Several
issues have developed which were discussed in a meeting of the
NAVAIR Civilian Management Board and the Middle Management
Council at Charlottesville, Virginia, in November, 1977. Some
of these issues are listed below.
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1. There is a lack of stated definitive "corporate"
(NAVAIRSYSCOM) strategy related to roles of the field activities
in the overall Naval Aviation Program. The absence of declared
top level strategy makes it difficult to develop a unified
corporate plan for field activity management and has resulted
in a lack of clarity and definition In roles. £Q
2. There has been a succession of piecemeal efforts at
dealing with many problems relating to field activity management
and utilization (e.g., decentralization, distribution of civilian
personnel, workloading, etc.) which result in operating In a
reactive, non-integrated, and non-systematic mode. {TJ
3. There are several Inconsistent pressures effecting the
effective and efficient management of field activities in the
area of contracting for services (e.g., OME Circular A-76, OMB
Circular A-109> Congressional language en FY-1978 contracting
policies, MAT-08 policies on the in-house prosecution of R&D). £Q
4. Issues relating to the modernity of the facilities and
equipment of the field activities have not been adequately
treated; maintenance and modernization of the physical plants
and buildings are not treated in a pro-active mode. £Q
5. Uncertain institutional funding existed due to shortages,
priority changes and unanticipated costs. [Y]
6. Unproductive redundancy appeared to exist. Fostering
this in part, was an inadequate communication process between
the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Headquarters and affected
field activities. £Q
7. Different goals and values existed as a result of many
varying perceptions and Influences as well as too many field
activity bosses (structural, functional). QTJ
8. Deviations from assigned functional roles occurred due
in part to the ready availability of resources outside assigned
mission/function areas. These resources and the related tasks
were viewed as tending to change the basic reason for which the
activity existed and for which it was created. \jQ
9. NAVAIR does not have adequate knowledge and control cf
workload (functions and tasks) performed by field activities.
For example:
a. Headquarters ha3 limited knowledge of the total work
being performed by our field activities.
b. The capabilities cf our field activities are net
adequately defined.

c. The Navy Lab Program causes problems of prioriti-
zation and responsiveness due to the separation of administrative
and technical management.
d. Field activities have no clear and disciplined
statement of roles, missions, responsibilities, and actual
functions
.
e. It is difficult to tie responsibility /authority/
accountability to field activities for programs.
f. Activities are performing functions for organizations
other than NAVAIR, which interferes with our priorities.
g. Classification of activities as currently designated
is confusing, and in some cases inaccurate. Example: PMTC is
not really just a T&E activity. QT]
10. Functions and facilities at some field activities
(particularly RDT&E activities) duplicate and overlap each other.
Because of duplication of capabilities, our field activities
compete for the same kind of work. For example Tactical software
systems are spread among several activities causing duplication
and waste. To further compound the problem the Navy Lab Program
tends to duplicate SYSCOM and other field efforts. £-0
11. Management policies, systems and procedures are inadeauate
a. The separation of administrative and technical
management in different groups within NAVAIR causes problems of
prioritization and responsiveness.
b. There is inadequate coordination within HO of field
workload, funding and manpower resources and tasks.
c. There is a critical imbalance between resources and
tasks.
d. We have no system to adjust ceilings at field
activities or between field activities and Headauarters
.
e. We have no system to balance facility requirements
and workload at field activities.
f. NAVAIR has an Inadequate workload control system
and no means to discipline that system.
g. NAVAIR field management policies are unclear.
h. Headquarters provides field activities with inade-
quate guidance.
i. Our employees have set up informal, inappropriate
networks to allocate tasks to field activities. £l]
10

Some of the issues above are overlapping; however, it should
be clear that a myriad of areas exist where change is reauired.
Some of these are spoken of in the past tense and policies have
changed since November 1977 > which would affect the management
of the field activities, but most of the issues still exist.
In addition to the Issues cited by the Civilian Management Board
and the Middle Management Council there are concerns relative to
the roles of the T&E field activities and their relationships
with the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR),
problems associated with the designation of most of the T&E
field activities as components of the Major Range and Test
Facilities Base, and problems in the application of the Uniform
Funding Policy to T&E field activity operation.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are to identify areas in the
management of the NAVAIR T&E field activities where improvements
are needed and to recommend changes to improve the system. In
the discussion that follows, these areas of concern will be
treated separately followed by recommendations for improvement
in each area. Recommendations are briefly restated in the
Summary of Recommendations. For the reader familiar with the
areas discussed, the recommendations are identified separately




To accomplish the objectives stated above, it is first
necessary to examine the environment in which NAVAIR and its
11

T&E field activities must operate. Policies and procedures
that have been established for the management of the T&E field
activities must be discussed. Finally, the devices which have
been developed to aid in the management must be analyzed.
To determine the environment in which NAVAIR operates,
specifically with regard to T&E and field activity operations,
a study of various publications was conducted. This was followed
by an examination of the instructions and directives of NAVAIR,
the Naval Material Command, and DoD which establish the policies
and procedures for NAVAIR management of its T&E field activities.
From this, a list of questions was generated to determine how
closely actual operations adhered to the established policies
and procedures. Responses to these questions were requested from
personnel at NAVAIR Headquarters and the T&E field activities.
It Is important to note that this was not a survey because the
questions did not lend themselves to simple multiple choice
answers and only the few people closely related to the problem
were asked to respond. Also, the questions were not uniformly
applicable to all the respondents. The results of these efforts
were analyzed and interpreted to allow the objectives of the
thesis to be satisfied.
D. BACKGROUND
Although problems still exist, defense systems acquisition
has improved greatly in the 1970 ' s. Prior to this time emphasis
was on total package procurement; however, about 1970 it was
realized, particularly by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, that
this concept was not working. This was largely due to over
12

optimistic cost and performance estimates and a lack of compe-
tition throughout the acquisition process. Competition existed
only at the paper study stage but design and price competition
were nearly non-existent. As a result of the recommendations of
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and other groups, policies began
to be developed which stressed demonstrated performance as a
requirement for continued development. This was further
emphasized in 1976 when Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-109 stressed that "each agency acquiring major systems should
provide strong checks and balances by ensuring adequate system
test and evaluation." [2J
The policies of A-109 are implemented in the Department of
Defense (DOD) by DOD Directive 5000.1 supported by 5000.2 and
5000.3, which is devoted to test and evaluation. DODD 5000.1
states
:
Programs should be structured and resources allocated
to ensure that the successful demonstration of. program
objectives is the pacing activity. RJ
Since demonstration of program objectives will require testing
it is obvious that test and evaluation in the allocation of
defense resources has increased greatly in importance. Further
evidence of this is the participation in all Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Councils (DSARC) of the Deputy Undersecretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering (Test and Evaluation)
whose responsibility It is to report to the DSARC and to the
Secretary of Defense on test planning and results.
The increased importance of test and evaluation has not been
without its problems. In its report the Blue Ribbon Defense
13

Panel recommended that each service establish an operational
test and evaluation organization independent of both the system
developers and the users. This has resulted in the establishment
of the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) by the Army
and of the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center (AFTEC) by the
Air Force. The Navy already had its Operational Test and Evalua-
tion Force (OPTEVFOR). All report directly to the office of
chief of staff of their services, assuring them of independence
from the developers and the users.
Over the past 10 years changes have been made in the acquisi-
tion process which reduce concurrency and program risk. The
price has been additional management reviews, an increase in
required test and evaluation, more use of competitive prototyping;
all of which greatly increase acquisition cycle time and cost.
Gansler has cited [VJ the effect in that older systems such as
the NIKE AJAX and the HAWK were fielded in 6 years and 5 years
respectively; whereas, newer systems such as PATRIOT and AEGIS
will take 19 and 18 years. This increase in acquisition cycle
time, and the ensuing efforts to reduce it, will result in
continual pressure to minimize the time spent on T&E and will




II. THE ENVIRONMENT OF
NAVAIR AND ITS T&E FIELD ACTIVITIES
A. DEVELOPMENTAL VERSUS OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
With the formation of the operational test organizations,
test and evaluation is now formally divided into two distinct
areas, Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational
Test and Evaluation (OT&E). DT&E is that which is conducted by
or for the Developing Agency. Its first purpose is as an
integral part of the iterative development process. Testing is
conducted to evaluate equipment design candidates and the results
are used to modify the design. This is followed by further
testing and modification. This process continues until the
initial paper design has been converted to fully developed
hardware. The second important function of DT&E is to provide
information on the progress of the system development. Performance
is measured against a set of time-phased cost and performance goals
and objectives to determine if the system costs and performance
are at the levels they should be at a given point in the program.
The results can be used as the basis for continuation or adjustment
to the development program as necessary. A third function of
DT&E is to help assure the project manager that he has a reasonable
expectation of succeeding in the OT&E which follows.
Early OT&E also aids in the design process. To the extent
that it is conducted on developmental hardware it helps to
identify operational deficiencies to allow for correction during
the development process. It also allows the comparison of
15

system performance with goals and objectives to determine program
status. The difference between OT&E and DT&E lies in the orien-
tation towards operational as opposed to technical factors and
the emphasis on predicting future performance rather than evalu-
ating current performance. The primary purpose of T&E then, is
to provide answers to the questions, "What is the program status?"
and "What is the likely outcome of the program?" JjQ
An important program consideration is the amount of scarce
resources to be allocated to the T&E process. Since both time
and money are consumed by the T&E process without visibly advancing
the program, the temptation is to minimize T&E. The danger lies
in fielding a system which is not technically or operationally
suitable
.
The problem is compounded by the fact that it is often
difficult to categorize tests as operational or developmental.
Policies have been established which discourage joint testing
unless it is dictated overwhelmingly by the costs of conducting
separate developmental and operational tests. The tendency,
therefore, is towards duplication of testing. Since the opera-
tional test agencies have no obligation to minimize overall
program costs or maintain the program schedule, there might be
a tendency to over test and to be over critical in their evalu-
ation of the results to aggrandize their own position in the
acquisition process. In the case of developmental testing the
situation is similar but slightly better. The developmental
testers work for the program manager and are dependent on him
for their funding; therefore, he has discretion in the amount
16

funds and time allocated to developmental testing. The dilemma
of the program manager is to decide how much time and money to
spend on developmental testing. The temptation is to over-
emphasize operational testing since he has little discretion in
this area, thereby minimizing his testing costs. The danger In
that approach is that a system that has not had the benefit of
sufficient test and modification of the iterative developmental
testing process may be killed by the sometimes overzealous
operational testers.
The culmination of OT&E is the OPEVAL which must be completed
prior to approval for full scale production. This is preceded
by a Certification of Readiness for OPEVAL which must be provided
to ensure that the system to be tested is sufficiently represen-
tative of the system that will ultimately be deployed. Procedures
for the Certification are provided by NAVAIRINST 3960.2A and
include a number of actions required by the various NAVAIR com-
ponents under the overall coordination of AIH-05. In theory the
process is relatively straightforward. In practice it has been
a significant problem area. Problems have arisen in determining
that the systems proposed for OPEVAL are representative of
production systems. Because the DT&E Inevitably points up
deficiencies which must be corrected in production, major
differences exist between the full scale development models and
the production items. Correction of these deficiencies and
configuration differences prior to OPEVAL is often time consuming
and costly. A further requirement for OPEVAL is that logistic
support, manning, and training for the operation of the system
17

during OPEVAL be representative of fleet deployment. This is
often not possible without considerable delay because development
of support equipment, training of personnel, and availability of
spares in the supply system lag significantly behind system
development. Readiness for OPEVAL, therefore, becomes a process
of negotiation rather than a check-off of tne elements as intended
This is a delicate process for the program manager, since he must
balance program schedule and cost constraints against the risks
of failing to satisfy OPEVAL requirements for lack of some of
the items mentioned above.
One of the primary objectives of OT&E, and particularly the
OPEVAL, is that it be conducted under conditions representative
of those to be expected in field operations. The reasons for
this are obvious; however, in practice it is often difficult to
achieve for the following reasons:
1. Inadequate threat environment.
The operating conditions include the enemy weapons
systems and their operational doctrine against which the system
under test must operate. Simulations of these systems do exist,
adequate for developmental testing; however, large scale networks
adequate to simulate the complete operational environment are
extremely expensive and do not exist.
2. Insufficient numbers of test systems.
For the same reasons it is desirable to operate against
a large scale threat environment, it is also desirable to operate
the system under test in conjunction with all the other systems
it is expected to live with and in the manner it is expected to
be operated. This is also extremely expensive and not generally
done except for individual compa tability tests.
3. Inadequate training of personnel.
The objective is to conduct the test utilizing personnel
that will operate the system in the field. Since schools have
usually not been established prior to a production decision,
18

adequately trained personnel do not exist. The systems must be
maintained by persons of higher skill level than the operators,
usually contractor personnel.
4. System immaturity.
In today's environment emphasis is placed on reliability,
The systems tested; however, have been built by different tech-
niques than will be used in full scale production. They will
suffer from "infant mortality" problems which the mature system
will not have. Also, with the limited number of systems and
operating hours available, a statistically valid estimate of
reliability usually cannot be determined.
5. Lack of production configured support equipment and
publications
.
This is related to the maintenance personnel problem.
The support equipment designs and the publications cannot be
determined until the production configuration of the prime
equipment is fairly well defined. Therefore, they are usually
not ready for testing in time and modified general purpose test
equipment must be used.
For obvious reasons it is desirable that objectivity and
independence be maximized in the test program. This is particu-
larly true of the OT&E. Since the DT&E is conducted under the
direction of the Developing Agency, biases are almost certain to
be present. Evaluation of the results is often difficult under
these conditions. In the OT&E the danger exists that "nice to
have" features will be interpreted as necessary since OT&E is
generally conducted without regard to system cost. Another less
likely possibility is to minimize deficiencies in seeking early
deployment. Factors which alleviate this problem are the checks
and balances between the DT&E and OT&E.
Previously, emphasis on OT&E was at program stages just
prior to the production decision because of the large funding
commitment at that point. Lately it has been realized that
emphasis on earlier OT&E is needed for four reasons.
19

1. In the early stages of system concept formulation It Is
necessary to know that the concepts are tactically sound.
2. To have any impact on system development OT&E must be
conducted earlier than just prior to the production decision
since by then most of the research and development resources
have been expended.
3. Cost and schedule impact can be minimized by early
detection and correction of operational deficiencies.
4. Commitment of funds for limited production prior to the
major production decision requires earlier availability of test
results. QQ
The role of OPTEVFOR is defined in Reference 6. It directs
OPTEVFOR involvement in all phases of the acquisition cycle and
provides for close coordination between OPTEVFOR and the developing
agency. Specifically, during the program validation phase OPTEVFOR
will:
Establish liaison with the developing agency for
providing operational planning assistance in determining
the testing required for the current project, anticipated
future testing requirements, and defining critical opera-
tional issues. £6j
Participate in test planning and independently observe
selected tests and demonstrations conducted by the develop-
ing agency, and examine test results. submit an assess-
ment of this initial test and evaluation to the Chief of
Naval Operations, and the developing agency, including
comments and recommendations concerning future operational
suitability of the system, progress to date, and operational
Issues requiring further examination. \o~]
During the full scale engineering development phase OPTEVFOR
will:
Independently observe selected developmental tests
and view the data from an operational viewpoint, to
verify readiness for operational testing. jjSJ
From this it can be seen that much of the work of the TScE
field activities will be evaluated by OPTEVFOR; therefore, it is
necessary to be continually aware of their opinions and priorities.
20

Test programs may have to be adjusted to help satisfy OPTEVFOR
requirements. Since ultimately responsibility for responding to
criticisms of the test programs will fall to the program manager
and his team, they should closely monitor the planning, conduce,
and results of the tests conducted by the field activities. This
will be discussed further in a later section.
B. THE MAJOR RANGE AND TEST FACILITY BASE
In 1970 the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recognized the need
for better test and evaluation management and recommended a major
DOD-wide study of test and evaluation facilities. The study was
completed in August 1971 and resulted in the formation of the
Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB), which consisted of
26 T&E activities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force with a combined
annual budget in excess of $1 billion. Pf] The activities
currently comprising the MRTFB are listed in Appendix A.
Policies for the use, management and operation of MRTFB
activities are established in Reference 8. The mission of the
MRTFB is to:
Provide a broad range and test support base to all DOD
Components responsible for development, test, evaluation
and operation, as applicable, of material and weapon systems,
and to other Federal Government Agencies having need for
that support. T8J
Overall responsibility within DOD is assigned to the Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Test
and Evaluation (DD(T&E)). Authorities and responsibilities for
DD(T&E), Secretaries of the military departments, Facility
commanders, and Facility users are established. Reference 9
21

assigns responsibility for management of Navy portions of the
MRTFB to the NAVAIR Assistant Commander for Test and Evaluation
(AIR-06).
C. THE UNIFORM FUNDING POLICY
Prior to fiscal year 1975 no single policy existed for
assessing the costs of operation of test facilities. Some
activities were funded institutionally. That is, money for
their operations was provided from a separate appropriation
independent of any program utilizing the test facilities. A
second method, industrial funding, required that facility users
pay all the costs, including overhead, of operating a facility.
A third policy required that users pay only the direct costs
associated with their tests, with the remainder of costs to be
paid from institutional funds. There were also combinations of
these methods which sometimes varied depending on who was the
user
.
The study completed in August 1971* noted that because of
the differences in funding policy, test site selection was often
based on cost to the user instead of test site capabilities. As
a result, in January 1973* the Deputy Secretary of Defense
directed the establishment of a Uniform Funding Policy at 18 of
the 26 MRTFB activities, with users paying direct costs and
indirect costs being paid from institutional funds. The policy
was incorporated into DODD 3200.11 and went into effect in
fiscal year 1975. The Navy activities to which the Uniform
Funding Policy applies are the Naval Air Propulsion Center,
22

Naval Air Test Center, Naval Weapons Center, Pacific Missile
Test Center, and the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation
Center.
DODD 3200.11 states that the intent of the Uniform Funding
Policy as follows:
1. Provide for interservice compa tability, efficiency and
equity, without influencing technical decisions on testing, nor
inhibiting legitimate and valid testing.
2. Reimbursement for use of the ranges and test facilities
will be required.
3. All the costs of the range or test facilities which are
not reimbursed by users will be funded by the management agency
of the particular range or facility.
4. All DOD Components and other Federal Government agencies
will reimburse the ranges and test facilities for direct
costs, excluding military labor.
5. Direct Costs. Those expenses which can be immediately
and directly identified with a specific User program (usually
documented by a job order). These costs include direct labor,
direct material, minor construction, special purpose equipment
and other like costs. They include all such expenses that can
with reasonable effort be identified consistently and uniformly
to specific User programs. The direct cost for labor includes
a load factor covering items such as leave and contributions to
the retirement program. 00
In concept the Uniform Funding Policy is relatively simple.
The implementation, however, has led to problems. Historically
it has been difficult to predict the workload of test activities
with any accuracy, even for the following fiscal year. Without
an accurate estimate of direct funding it is impossible to
accurately budget the institutional funds required. Expenditures
for civilian personnel are relatively fixed and pricrity for use
of institutional funds must be in this area. The impact is on
capital expenditures for new test capabilities. An orderly
program is difficult to establish because funds must be held Ir.
23

escrow against the possible shortfall of direct funding. This
will be discussed in a later section.
Problems also result for the users of the test facilities
because of program delays. If the user plans a test for a given
fiscal year, allocates the money to the test activity, and because
of system problems the test is delayed beyond the end of the
fiscal year, the program manager finds himself at the end of
the fiscal year with the allocated test funds he can no longer
use and he still must provide test funding out of the following
year's budget.
Increases in administrative workload as a result of the
implementation of the Uniform Funding Policy have been docu-
mented. £9j These increases were due largely to the increased
budgeting requirements and the need for more detailed estimates
and reports. The increased workload has largely been absorbed
with existing, already limited, personnel resources. The increased
workload was not limited to comptroller personnel, but also
affected technical personnel and detracted from their attention
to their technical duties.
D. THE BUDGET PROCESS
1. Discussion
The process by which NAVAIR must prepare budgets for
T&E field activity operations is complicated by the fact that
they are funded from multiple appropriations. Institutional
funding is provided from the Category V, Management and Support,
funds. User funding may come from Research, Development. Test
24

and Evaluation, Navy (RDT&EN) funds or from one of the procurement
accounts, depending on the actual project being prosecuted. The
problem, then, becomes one of balancing the amounts budgeted from
each appropriation to avoid violation of Section 3678 of the U.S.
Code which states that funds must only be spent for the purpose
for which they are appropriated. Reference 10 states:
Apportionment of funds Includes an amount for unfunded
reimbursements expected to be earned during the fiscal
year. The allocation of these anticipated reimbursements
must not exceed the expected year-end gross unfunded
accounts receivable. Work supported by reimbursable
orders is to be financed within the subhead under which
the order is accepted.
Budget estimates for Navy procurement appropriations are
submitted by NAVAIR to NAVMAT where they are consolidated and
submitted to the Office of Budget and Reports/Fiscal Management
Division which is responsible for formulation of the total Navy
budget. Budget estimates for the RDT&EN appropriation are
submitted by NAVAIR, usually by a different office than for the
procurement appropriations, to the Deputy Chief of Naval Material
for Development where they are coordinated and submitted to the
Office of Naval Research for consolidation and ultimate submission
to the Office of Budget and Reports/Fiscal Management Division.
The separation of budget responsibilities makes consolidation
of the various appropriations budgets into a single budget
estimate for T&E field activity operations difficult, if not
impossible. Paragraph 7 of Reference 11 requires that NAVAIR
users of the T&E field activities submit written fiscal plannl
information to AIR-6103, the T&E Field Activity Support 3ranch
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of AIR-06. This would help alleviate the problem; however,
responses to questions do not Indicate that the policy is being
followed.
Another problem in the budgeting process is the time limita-
tion on the availability of funds. Congress enacts RDTScEN
appropriations for two years but Navy policy is "to program
RDT&E effort on an annual incremental funding basis as opposed
to the fully funded basis on which procurement programs are
developed." (j.l] The Navy Comptroller Manual states:
Although the RDT&EN appropriation is legally available
for obligation for 2 fiscal years, the objective is to
use these funds during the initial year of availability.
The budget should be formulated to reflect this funding
objective. However, if the award of a planned new
contract, or the issuance of a reimbursable order, is
not possible until the second year of availability,
the preferred action is to restructure the funding plan
to utilize the original funding in the first year of
availability for urgent deficiencies elsewnere in the
program and to use the following year's appropriation
to fund new contracts or orders. Q.lJ
This policy exacerbates the problem mentioned earlier in
reference to the Uniform Funding Policy. Program managers need
not lose their funds due to program slippages if the money is
legally available for another year.
2. Recommenda tions
The policy requiring users of the TScE field activities
to submit written fiscal planning information to AIR-6102, if
followed, would improve the ability to prepare accurate consoli-
dated budget estimates for TScZ field activity operations.
Adherence to this policy should be further emphasized 3S it
would help give NAVAIR managers 3 better grasp of the overall
costs of T&E in the acquisition process.
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The policy which requires obligation of all of the
RDT&EN funds of a fiscal year appropriation within the first
year of availability should be reexamined. There may be more
advantages than disadvantages in allowing the money to be
obligated throughout the full two years it is available.
E. MAJOR AND LES3-THAN-MAJ0R SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS
Policies and procedures for major systems acquisitions have
been well established and documented at length. This area has
received considerable attention because of the large sums of
money involved. For less-than-ma jor systems the 3um involved
in a single acquisition is smaller and, therefore, of less
importance. Nevertheless, when all of the less-than-ma jor
systems acquisitions are considered in aggregate the amount
involved is not trivial. Unfortunately, for these systems che
procedures have not been as well established, particularly with
regard to establishing T&E requirements and planning to satisfy
those requirements.
One reason for the problem is the volatility of the acquis icier,
process. DOD Directive 5000.1, the document that prescribes
policies and procedures for major system acquisition, has teen
rewritten twice within the last five years and is currently
being rewritten again. Below the level of DODD 5000. 1 there are
numerous instructions and directives which implement the broad
policy guidelines. When the major policy document changes as
rapidly as it has, these subordinate documents almost never
catch up. This results in directives which are often in cc ^c
with each other and it is often impossible to be in compliance
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with all the current Instructions. Also, programs are generally
of such duration that they outlast changes in policy. Thi3 is
particularly true when it is realized that many programs consist
of derivatives of existing programs and, therefore, do not fit
Into the current phases of the acquisition process.
Policies and procedures for test and evaluation established
by higher authority are implemented within NAVAIR by NAVAIRINST
3960. 2A which states:
The provisions of this instruction apply to the following:
All acquisition projects including thc3e classified as
Acquisition Categories (ACAT) I, II, III, and IV projects.
Projects involving significant modifications tc existing
systems and equipment whose Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) and Procurement Appropriation Funding
Requirements and other criteria would qualify them as ACAT
I, II, III, or IV projects.
Individual subsystems, equipment or components developed
as a part of a major system such as a radar equipment, a computer,
acoustic processor, etc. which are susceptible to separate T&E
and which are required by competent authority to be the subject
of a separate Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) or Test and
Evaluation Plan (TEP).
"Off-the-shelf" commercial systems and equipments or signi-
ficant modifications thereof when the program decision authority
approves this alternative in lieu of new development to meet an
established mission need.
Individual subsystems, equipment or components which are not
developed as a part of a major weapon system and which are
susceptible to separate T&E and are required by competent
authority to be the subject of a separate TEMP to TEF. Q2J
Definitions of the Acquisition Categories are given in
Appendix B. The TEMP and TEP will be discussed in a later
section. From the statement above and the definition of the
Acquisition Categories it can be seen chat It is unlikely that
the provisions of a formal T&E program would not apply to most
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acquisitions. NAVAIRINST 3960. 2A is relatively new and it will
take some time to determine if the policies are followed for all
acquisition projects; however, if it is applied, it will go a
long way towards improving the budgeting of T&E field activity
operations. This is especially important in today's environment
of conversions in lieu of procurement and service life extension
programs.
F. THE TEST AND EVALUATION MASTER PLAN
To help make the T&E of major 3y3tems an orderly process,
the program manager is required by OPNAVINST 396O.IO to submit
a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The TEMP is the
controlling T&E planning document prepared by NAVAIR In collabor-
ation with NAVMAT, OPTEVFOR, and the Board of Inspection and
Survey, when applicable, and Is approved by OPNAV. 12 It
serves as a contract between the Developing Agency and the user
for the T&E to be conducted throughout the program. Included
are information on program goals and milestones, system parameters,
performance and cost thresholds, and test resource requirements.
The test schedule and the level of testing to be conducted are
keyed to the major project milestones. Separate sections are
provided for DT&E and OT&E. The DT&E section is prepared by
NAVAIR and the OT&E section is prepared by OPTEVFOR. Emphasis
is placed on resolving issues prior to submittal to OPNAV;
however, sometimes this is not possible and the TEMP must be
submitted with open Issues for OPNAV resolution.
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The TEP is the controlling T&E planning document for ACAT
IV projects and is approved by the Deputy Commander, NAVAIR.
It is prepared within NAVAIR and contains the same type of
planning information contained in the TEMP for larger programs.
Prior to seeking a Milestone I decision the program manager
is required to have the T&E plan prepared. For major programs
it is required as an annex to the Decision Coordinating Paper,
the document used as the basis for the Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council recommendation and the Secretary of Defense decislcr.
The initial version is to avoid specifics of the test program
and concentrate on the broad test plan and the critical tests
required for satisfying major project objectives. Also, it is
to identify the total resource needs for the test program in
terms of manpower, material, facilities and funding. The plan
is to be revised during the life cycle to add details as they
become known. The revision prior to the Milestone II decision
should contain sufficient test program specifics to ensure that
the planned testing is sufficient to demonstrate program
requirements
.
Within NAVAIR Headquarters AIR-OS, the Systems and Engineering
Group, is responsible for the technical content of the T&E plan
and technical direction of the T&E program. AIR-06 is responsible
for integrating the various elements, coordinating the staff
review of documents, coordinating with the T&E field activities
and arranging for the required AIR-06 managed resources.
The use of T&E planning documents has the potential to greatly
improve the forecasting of user requirements and funding for the
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T&E field activities and to aid in overall forecasting of field
activity workload and requirement for institutional funding.
The effectiveness and efficiency of the TEMP process has not
been optimized, however, because it has not been sufficiently
integrated with the other information systems available to




III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ELEMENTS
OF T&E FIELD ACTIVITY CONTROL
A. APPLICABLE DIRECTIVES AND INSTRUCTIONS
A list of most of the major directives and instructions
applicable to the structure and management of NAVAIR T&E programs
and the operation of the T&E field activities is included in
Appendix C.
B. DIVISIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
1. Discussion
Policies and procedures for planning and conducting
NAVAIR T&E programs are contained in NAVAIR Instruction 3960.2A.
Overall project responsibility is delegated to the program
managers (PMA) for the individual programs; however,, the primary
functional responsibilities for T&E are delegated to AIR-06 and
AIR-05. the Systems and Engineering Group. Figures 1 and 2 show
the relationship of NAVAIR with external organizations and the
relationship of the various elements within NAVAIR. Gucting
from 396O. 2A:
The MATACQ Group (AIR-05 ) is line responsible for the
performance of the full set of acquisition functions
within the matrix project management concept except for
those specific program areas assigned to other Headquarters
Groups (e.g., Target Systems). Accordingly, Air-05 is
responsible for coordination of the implementation of the
comprehensive T&E programs and the planning, execution,
and technical evaluation of the DT&E and PAT&E (except for
BIS Acceptance Trials) elements thereof. The T&E Group
(AIR-Ob) is the designated single point of contact for
NAVAIR T&E program matters and as such is line responsible
for the Interpretation and implementation of all T&E










































































































and promulgate appropriate NAVAIR policies and procedures
to provide T&E guidance and assistance to all organizational
units within NAVAIR. AIR-06 also provides NAVAIR and Navy-
wide management of specifically assigned NAVAIR T&E field
activities and Navy elements of the DOD Major Range and
Test Facility Base (MRTFB).
(The title of AIR-05 was changed from Material Acquisition Group
to Systems and Engineering Group on 2 April 1979.)
Significant responsibilities of AIR-05 and AIR-06 in
the control of field activity operations, as specified in NAVAIR
Instruction 3960. 2A are listed below.
For AIR-05:
In collaboration with AIR-06 participate in the surveys
of candidate T&E field activities to assess their inaividual
availability, capability, and applicability to accomplish the
planned T&E programs
.
Ensure coordination with AIR-06 on matters of T&E
policy, T&E resource requirements, selection of supporting T&E
field activities and contractors and funding estimates for
support of the DT&E and PAT&S programs.
Prepare and coordinate with AIR-06, the AIRTASK and




Provide executive management for all of the NAVAIR T&E
field activities.
Maintain working Interfaces with all available T&E
activities including Navy, Army, and Air Force elements of the
DOD MRTFB, as well as the Navy laboratories and appropriate
industrial concerns, in order to establish an awareness and
understanding of the T&E resources available for selection to
support NAVAIR T&E programs.
Conduct surveys for the selection of field activity
sites for the conduct of specific acquisition project T&E
programs
.
Approve test site selections .






(d) Expediting T&E reports from the T&E field
activities.
Provide T&E representation to the NAVAIR Change Control
Boards to enable planning for T&E resource support for the
T&E of the modification programs at the AIR-06 managed field
activities.
Responsibilities of the T&E field activities are as follows:
Provide assistance to AIR-05 and to OPTEVFOR and BIS
when appropriate in structuring the T&E programs for acquisition
projects and in planning the elements thereof.
Provide budgetary estimates for the accomplishment of
T&E workload scheduled for their respective activities.
Identify T&E resources required to support approved
T&E plans (TEMP'S and TEP s )
.
Provide representatives for site survey teams when
requested by NAVAIRHQ (AIR-06).
Perform T&E directed by NAVAIR AIRTASK/Work Unit
Assignments.
Provide test reports on a timely basis to support the
project decision making process at milestone points identified
In the approved test plan.
Advise NAVAIR (AIR-05/06) promptly of actual or
threatened slippages in the completion of work assignments
which may impact the scheduled key project milestones shown
in the approved test plan and provide recommendations for
dealing with the causes thereof.
Advise NAVAIR (AIR-05/06) promptly when test results
indicate major deficiencies which will require system or
equipment redesign to enable meeting the T&E program objectives
stated in the applicable TEMP or TEP or which are likely to
result in the breaching of performance, schedule and funding
thresholds stated in the applicable DCP/NDCP.
Responsibility for Introducing the controlling workload
at Navy MRTFB activities (the T&E field activities plus portions
of other Naval Material Command activities) is assigned to AIR-06
by NAVMAT Instruction 396O.IO. As such, they are required to
perform workload management and be responsive to the technical
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guidance of workload sponsors (primarily AIR-05). V/orkloati
sponsors are required to provide timely notification of workload
assignments to activity commanders to ensure proper support.
The responsibilities of various organizations and the flow of
documentation required are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Qf]
Figure 3 applies to workload sponsored by NAVAIR; whereas,
Figure 4 applies to workload sponsored by organizations external
to NAVAIR. It should be noted that the project estimate Is
broken into direct and institutional funds. To provide for
advanced planning the instruction requires that fiscal planning
information for the next five fiscal years be provided to AIR-06
by 1 May of each year. The MRTFB activities are to submit
workload plans for all work assigned. As was mentioned in the
section on the Uniform Funding Policy, it is difficult to
forecast the work of a T&E activity even one year in advance.
Forecasting for five years is extremely imprecise. This is
particularly true because the forecasting is being done oy the
T&E activity itself rather than the users. Even knowing what
programs are scheduled for the next five years, it is often net
possible to predict requirements the users will generate for
T&E support.
In Figures 3 and 4, the portion of the project estimates
submitted by the field activities for institutional funds ar°
used primarily for improving facilities and equipment. Unfortun-
ately,, no formalized provisions exist for tying these elements
together into a coordinated plan for updating the facilities

















































































































and Modernization (I&M) program has been established by AIR-06
in an attempt to improve this situation. Various efforts such
as Project 20 have required the field activities to project their
facilities and equipment improvement needs so that planning for
these requirements can be done in a centralized, logical manner.
Provisions for incorporating into these projections requirements
for general facilities improvements that are not directly tied
to projects have been inadequate. Funding in this area has been
very uncertain, probably due to the fact that insufficient
justifying information is available to secure the funds. Institu-
tional funds for this purpose are usually what is left after all
other needs have been satisfied and are inevitably insufficient.
2. Recommendations
To improve the ability to plan and budget the workload
of the field activities, closer dialogue between the activities
and the users is recommended. The T&E field activities should
be considered to be and treated as a part of the NAVAIR team,
not subject to the arm's-length relationship required with
contractors.
To provide for required updating of facilities at the
field activities, efforts should continue for a strong I&M
program. This should include both direct, project related, and
general requirements.
C. THE FIELD ACTIVITIES
Management guidance at the field activities is primarily
concerned with the preparation of aggregate information on
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operating budgets and workload. Another area of concern Is
assignment of personnel ceilings. Project work is nominally
assigned to a single point of contact at the field activity.
In actuality, however, the primary project interface is between
the operating personnel at the field activity and the "users'"
at Headquarters. Because of this, the operating people are
serving two different, and often conflicting, masters. The
degree to which this is a problem probably varies between field
activities for a variety of reasons, but particularly the size
of the organization and the degree to which management and
operating people are separated. A result of the disconnect
between the management and operating personnel is that while
management is seeking additional resources to perform existing




Currently, there is no overall priority system for
NAVAIR. Field activities establish their own priorities based
on informal guidance from various sources and their own percep-
tions of what is most important. This has the advantage of
allowing them the flexibility to respond to situations based on
first-hand knowledge of the situation. Efficient scheduling Is
allowed without micromanagement from Headauarters . Cn the other
hand, under this system, priorities tend to be more dependent
on the dollar value of the test program than on its overall
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urgency and value to fleet operations and National defense.
Also, local establishment of priorities may tend to ignore Life
Cycle considerations and the requirement to complete certain
testing prior to a scheduled Milestone Decision.
2. Recommendation
To date, the absence of an overall priority system has
not resulted in any major problems. This is primarily because
no major program has been delayed significantly due to lack of
T&E resources. As the requirements for T&E programs become more
formalized and the length and complexity increase this situation
can be expected to change. Reductions in resources will exacerbate
the situation and delays will be incurred. When this happens it
will be imperative that a single priority system is able to
establish the order of precedence of the various programs. The
problem has been recognized and AIR-610 has been working with
AIR-620 and AIR-59 to develop a priority management process.
These efforts should continue until a workable system has been
devised and implemented.
E. PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS
Because of policy changes in recent years a continuing
pressure for reduced personnel at Headquarters and at the field
activities has developed. The Office of Management and Budget
in Circular A-76 stressed the contracting out of work to the
private 3ector when practical. Congressional pressures to reduce
the average grade level of civilian employees has beer, increasing
in recent years. In response to these pressures the level of
review for filling of jobs, particularly at the middle and upper
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management levels, has been raised. Quotas on the filling of
vacancies have been established and several positions have been
downgraded. The result has been that the number of positions
occupied has decreased much more rapidly than ceiling point
reductions would indicate. Furthermore, all of this is occurring
in the face of increasing complexity of systems being acquired
and T&E requirements for these systems. Since little relief of
the situation can be expected in the near future, the only hope
for solution is to use the remaining resources more efficiently
through even greater centralization of controls to Headquarters.
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IV. DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
A. AIRTASKS AND WORK UNIT ASSIGNMENTS
1. Discussion
Project work is currently assigned to the field activity
by Airtask. The policy and procedures for AIRTASKS are established
by NAVAIRINST 3900. 8A. £l|] The AIRTASK, generally no more than
two pages in length, represents an outline of the work to be
performed. It includes background information, detailed require-
ments, source and disposition of project equipment and aircraft,
reports required, and a funding estimate. The background
information discusses events leading to the project and estab
the need. The detailed requirements provide a list of the
specific functions to be performed. These are usually very broad
and provide maximum flexibility for Interpretation as the project
progresses and the perception of the details of the reauirements
change. The source and disposition of project equipment and
aircraft usually only states that existing assets should be used,
that they will be provided, or that requirements should be
coordinated with the NAVAIRSYSCOM Aircraft Custodian. The reports
required may vary greatly but usually include, as a minimum, a
final report and recently, a detailed project plan to be submitted
early in the prosecution of the project. The funding estimate
states the amount of money to be provided for the project by




Work Unit Assignments are subordinate elements of an
AIRTASK for the performance of a specific task within the scope
of the previously assigned AIRTASK. The same form (NAVAIR 3930/1)
is used for both AIRTASKS and Work Unit Assignments.
To help ensure efficient utilization of resources NAVAIRINST
3900.8A requires that all assignments Involving T&E be coordinated
with AIR-620, the T&E Projects Division of AIR-06. This is an
important step in centralizing the control of field activity
operations and promoting optimum use of their resources. On the
other hand, it reduces the authority of the technical managers
to deal directly with the field activities for work to be
performed. For this reason the policy is followed reluctantly,
if at all.
The AIRTASK/Work Unit Assignment includes a section for
detailed requirements. Quite often this section receives
inadequate attention so that there is not a clear understanding
between the originator and field activity personnel of what is
required. This may be alleviated somewhat by referencing a work
unit plan which has been generated by the field activity. This
is satisfactory only if the person directing the work has read
and understood the work unit plan and concurs in what it
proposes. This is not always the case. Another method which
may be used to promote understanding of the requirements Is to
require the field activity to submit a detailed program plan.
Unfortunately, the instruction does not stress that this should
be an iterative process, continuing until an agreement has been





To avoid misunderstanding and to help preclude completion
of the test program without satisfying the objectives, discussions
should be held and proposed AIRTASKS/VORK UNITS should be reviewed
prior to formal promulgation of the AIRTASK/WCRK UNIT. This
procedure should also be followed for detailed project plans
when they are required. The discussions should include the user,
the field activity, and AIR-620 representatives.
B. TEST PLANS
1. Discussion
Currently there is no standard method or format for test
plans common to all field activities, nor is there a requirement
to submit the test plan for review. This allows the field
activities maximum latitude to establish procedures. This is
particularly important in the area of flight safety where each
activity assumes accident reporting responsibility and, therefore,
must have the authority to establish their own safety procedures.
2. Recommenda tions
In spite of the need for maximum flexibility at the field
activities, there is also a need for closer control by project
personnel at headquarters. Field activity personnel are not
always aware of important considerations which must be emphasized
in the test program. To help ease this problem a base line format
for test plans should be established which the field activities
could modify to suit their own individual requirements. Test
plans should be required by the AIRTASK/Work Unit Assignment to
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be submitted for review. However, this provision must be used
carefully to avoid loss of field activity flexibility and
independence and to maintain an objective test program.
C. REPORTING THE RESULTS OF T&E
1. Discussion
For T&E to be of any value the results must be reported
to the decision makers in a timely manner. Also, they must be
reported in such a way that they may be easily and rapidly
understood by someone who does not have a great deal of time to
read lengthy reports. In the case of discrepant performance,
the sooner the discrepancy is reported and action is taken to
correct it, the less costly the correction is likely to be. The
further the development or production process proceeds before a
discrepancy is discovered, the more that must be corrected once
it is discovered.
No standard procedures have been established for
reporting the results of T&E by the various field activities.
Reports have been late and of little value because of the
lateness. Information that has been used has been passed through
briefings, letters, and messages. The report has only served as
a record of what has been accomplished and is used very little
as the basis for decisions. Under this system, only major
discrepancies are reported in a timely manner. Minor problems,
which taken together may have major Impact, are generally not
reported until the test program is complete when, in some cases,
it may be too late to correct them.
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Procedures have not been developed at Headquarters to
process incoming reports and make them readily available to
anyone who needs them. They go to the code sponsoring the work
and other codes designated by the field activity originating the
report, but not necessarily to all offices requiring knowledge
of the test results. No system exists that can be accessed by
anyone needing the information to tell if a report has been
submitted on a project, and, if so, how to locate the report.
Field activity emphasis has been on current testing with
reports being written and reviewed as the schedule allows. This
is as much due to the reluctance of personnel to do the writing
as it is due to any established policies. To overcome this
reluctance, methods could be devised to make -the writing simpler
and shorter. The use of deficiency reports is a good example of
this. The deficiency reports are brief enough so that they can
be easily generated with minimum detail and be modified as more
is learned by submitting additional reports. They are submitted
as problems are noted, not at the end of the test program. The
use of deficiency reports, however, greatly increases the number
of reports which must be tracked, including the actions taken
as a result of the reports. This increases the requirement for
a system to record all reports so that they may be accessed
rapidly.
2. Recommenda tions
To improve the usefulness of T&E reports, standard
procedures should be established for their submission. This
should include a standard report format and should be based on
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a system similar to that currently used for deficiency reports.
Reporting requirements must be kept brief to allow timeliness.
As a part of an overall T&E information system, procedures should
be established to track all reports for easy access and to track
actions taken as a result of the reports.
D. WORK UNIT SUMMARIES AND FIELD ACTIVITY PLANS
Navy MRTFB activities are required by Reference 11 to submit
Work Unit Summaries for all current and expected projects to
AIR-06 for use in planning and preparing the MRTFB budget and in
the management of direct workload at the MRTFB activities.
Included are appropriation and project information and estimates
of the manpower and funding requirements of the project. Also,
included is Information on the backgrouna, objectives ana progress
of the project. Reference 11 also directs that workload sponsors
provide wriuten fiscal guidance to AIR-06 and the MRTFB activities
If the system works properly, the Work Unit Summaries should
reflect this fiscal guidance. It has been the author's experience
that this is rarely the case; however, the instruction is
relatively new and the situation may improve with time.
Detailed back-up information for the manpower and cost
estimate of the Work Unit Summary is provided by the Field
Activity Plan. The manpower estimates are broken down by
functional area and by type of personnel (military or civilian.).
The cost estimates are broken into manpower, material, flight
hours, travel, contract, and funding to other activities.
Obviously, this information must be balanced against the fiscal
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guidance from the workload sponsors and, theoretically, the
fiscal guidance should reflect the cost estimate if there is to
be any agreement on what is to be done for how much. Again,
there is little indication that this is the case, but hopefully
the situation will improve.
E. COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION SYSTEM
1. Discussion
Many of the problems discussed to this point result from
poor information flow. Much of this could be improved with
revision and integration of the information systems used for T&E
field activity management into a unified comprehensive information
system.
It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine the environment
in which such an information system must operate, existing systems
and the feasibility of establishing an information system which
will allow efficient management of resources at the Headquarters
and field activity levels.
Currently various systems have been established at the
field activities, primarily to manage their own internal
resources and to provide accounting for the funding allocated
for various projects. In terms of the overall NAVAIR organization
these are primarily operations control systems with some lower
level management control applications. To better control the
test and evaluation process the TEMP is required for each major
acquisition project. The TEMP outlines the testing required,
the schedule, and required resources. Field Activity Plans and
Work Unit Summaries outline the financial, manpower, and squlpne
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resource requirements and the approach to be taken. None of
these documents, however, provides a complete picture of the
capabilities, resources available, resources required, and
workload of each of the field activities individually or in
aggregate. The feasibility of establishing such a system should
be investigated.
The groundwork has now been established for the examina-
tion of the environment of such a system in the NAVAIR organi-
zation. Size of the organization does net appear as a deterrent
to establishment of an information system. In fact, just the
opposite is true. The large and diverse nature would seem to
dictate that an information system be established if adequate
planning of resource allocation and utilization is to be
accomplished.
The organizational structure of NAVAIR and its field
activities may represent one of the most formidable barriers to
the establishment of an effective Information system. The
organization Is extremely decentralized. Each of the field
activities has its own command structure with its own motives
which in actuality may or may not align with the overall NAVAIR
goals. Further the field activities report to no single authority
within headquarters. Nor do headquarters personnel deal with
single points of contact at the field activities. Different
headquarters offices are involved depending on whether the
matters in question are associated with the conduct of individual
projects or overall administrative control and support. The
headquarters personnel associated with specific project areas
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generally deal directly with field activity personnel who will
be working on their projects. Because of these factors an
extreme amount of coordination and cooperation would be required
if a usable information system is to be established.
Several factors effect the time frame within which an
information system would need to be constructed. NAVAIR, in its
role as developing agency, must deal with continuous change.
Technology is changing rapidly and continuously, but also the
regulations regarding systems acquisition and thus the methods
that are required to be used are al30 continually changing. This
often dictates that the interface with the field activities change
from time to time. These changes, however, are usually relatively
minor, and the relationship between NAVAIR and its field activities
has not changed substantially in several years. Field activity
control can probably be made more efficient and effective through
the use of an information system; however, time constraints do
not appear to be such that pressure exists for a development
project that must be rushed to the exclusion of adequate planning.
The organization in which the information system must
operate is somewhat difficult to define. There are organizational
segments which clearly have a large role as the prime contributors
and users. However, there are other segments of the organization
that will impact the operation whose participation is not clearly
defined. The prime headquarters users of the system would be
AIR-06; however, since a large portion of the interface between
NAVAIR and the field activities includes the assignment of work
by other parts of the organization, their inputs to the system

are also required. The relationships between these organiza-
tional components is undergoing changes which will take some
time to settle into focus. Until this occurs the organization
cannot be considered mature and this must be recognized as a
possible stumbling block to the establishment of a successful
information system.
NAVAIR Headquarters does not have in-house hardware or
personnel to be utilized for the development and operation of
the information system. Hardware and many of the personnel
assets required exist at the field activities. Hardware could
probably be made available on a time-sharing basis; however,
whether or not personnel could be made available for the project
would require some study. Also, it may be undesirable to have
any one of the field activities established as the central
location for information system data storage and analysis. A
possible alternative is to contract the development and operation
of the information system to an outside consulting organization.
This is attractive since contractual mechanisms could be used to
help control cost and schedule. The real problem arises in
finding sufficient funding to adequately support the effort.
Since the field activity control task is currently being performed
without major difficulties being apparent at levels controlling
the funds, a major effort will be required to sell the benefits
of the system. One possibility to accomplish this might be tc
cite examples of past inefficiencies and their associated costs
which could have been avoided with the proposed information
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system in operation. A side benefit of this would be to help
define the areas toward which the informa tior. system should be
directed.
Attitudes about information systems are, unfortunately,
generally hostile. Too often the same data have been required
to be submitted several times in different formats to satisfy
different information systems only to have the results of
considerable effort go unused for any significant decisions
regarding the operation of the organization. Expectations for
an information system would probably be low; therefore, any
demonstration of successful operation would probably come as a
welcome surprise. One of the biggest problems is convincing
the operations level people who make most of the inputs to the
system that it is worth their while to spend the time and effort
to make the inputs accurate. This could be significantly aided
if the same information is required cnly once and if pa3t
information submitted may be easily reviewed and updated without
complete resubmission. Also, it is necessary that they be
convinced that the results of their efforts serve some useful
purpose. For these reasons it is important that the managers
who are potential users of the system be convinced that it la
worth their effort to stay involved in the development of the
system beyond the establishment of the initial requirements.
Assuming that in spite of the draw backs cited in the
preceding paragraphs, it is decided that an information system
for the controlling of field activity operations is worth the
effort, it is possible to look at what might be some of the
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elements of the Information system target. At least, the
definition and some of the planning stages can be examined.
Various systems have already been established at the
field activity or operational level which may be modified or
used intact as Inputs to the Information system. Some direction
from headquarters as to the type of information required in the
system is also required. For these reasons the parallel approach
of Reference 14, where operational systems and planning and
control systems are developed simultaneously, seems to be appro-
priate for this information system development. Top down is
ruled out because it would probably require more top management
support than is available. This would be particularly true when
attempting to integrate information from the various parts of
the matrix organization. On the other hand, bottom up would be
easier to accomplish, but due to differences between the field
activities it is doubtful that a system with sufficient integration
to be useful could be attained this way.
There is little requirement for the field activities to
exchange information between themselves; therefore, there is no
requirement for a high degree of integration at this point. They
should, however, be able to pass the same information in the
same formats to headquarters for further aggregation and analysis.
Although this is desirable it does not mean that nothing useful
can be gained treating the information received from each of the
field activities by itself. For example, aircraft requirements
for current and future projects can be analyzed for each field
activity individually. On the other hand, requirements fcr
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funding for new instrumentation and facilities mu3t be compared
for all activities to establish priorities for allocation of
extremely scarce resources.
Because of the psychological climate in which the system
must operate, innovation and the attendant risk should be kept
to a minimum. It is important to achieve early, if modest,
successes to maintain and improve support for the 3ystem. One
area where some innovation may be allowed is data base management.
This technique offers considerable appeal in terras of establishing
the system such that a given piece of data information needs to
be entered into the system only once, which will make the system
attractive to those who must feed it.
2. Recommenda tion
The priorities, specific functions, and goals of the
projected information system require considerable in-depth
investigation beyond the scope of this thesis. These could be
developed using the preceding discussion and discussions with
personnel who would be involved in the operation and use of the
system. A study should be established involving, as a minimum,
representatives of AIR-05, AIR-06, and the T&E field activities.
High level attention must be maintained to ensure proper support
for the system instituted as the result of this study. In the
establishment of the information system a consultant familiar
with the establishment of information systems should be hired to
prevent many of the pitfalls which might not be seen by someone
unfamiliar with the process of establishing an information system.
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Emphasis in the development should be placed on ease of submission
and updating of information and information requirements should
be limited to those for which a valid use has been identified.
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V. PROBLEM AREAS AND OPPORTUNITIES
A. ACTIVITY MISSION STATEMENT OVERLAP
1. Discussion
There are four T&E field activities, listed In Table 1,
under the administrative control of AIR-06. In addition signi-
ficant NAVAIR T&E functions are performed at the Naval Weapons
Center and the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center,
although they are not NAVAIR field activities. The missions of
the field activities are stated In NAVAIR Instruction 5451.82.
Some areas are clearly within the mission of only one of the
field activities. In other areas, however, there is considerable
overlap in the stated missions. As an example, the mission
statements of the two largest field activities, the Naval Air
Test Center (NATC) and the Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC)
are quoted below. For NATC the mission is:
"To conduct tests and evaluation of aircraft weapons
systems and their components." £L5j
For PMTC the mission is:
"To perform development test and evaluation, develop-
ment support, follow-on engineering, logistics and training
support, for naval weapons, weapons systems and related
devices; provide major range, technical and base support
for Fleet users and other DOD and government agencies." [15]
This is only one example. There are overlaps with other
activities also. NAVAIRINST 5451.82 also states the specific
functions to be performed by the field activities in the accomplish'




NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
TEST AND EVALUATION FIELD ACTIVITIES
Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, N.M.
Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, N.J.
Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, MD.
Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, C.
The result of this overlap is a certain amount of
wasteful duplication of facilities and capabilities and the
competition between field activities cited by the Civilian
Management Board/Middle Management Council [TJ and discussed in
the Introduction. Certainly, some of the duplication is
necessary. All test ranges must have position measurement,
communications, and data gathering and processing systems. Also,
a certain amount of competition is inevitable and, in fact,
beneficial because It helps to keep the field activities effi-
cient and responsive to the needs of Headquarters. The key to
whether the duplication is wasteful or not is In the amount of
marketing done by the field activities for work and the degree
to which the capacity of the field activities, as a group, is
utilized. The marketing that accompanies the competition between
the activities often results In waste because work is performed
that is not really necessary. This would seem to indicate that
capacity is not being utilized efficiently and some wasteful
duplication does exist. This is paradoxical because in many
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cases the field activities claim to be overworked, underfunded,
and understaf fad, yet the inertia of the system causes them tc
continue to seek new work. In fact, at different levels in the
organization there exist different perceptions of what the work
level really is. One level of management may be actively pursuing
new projects while another level is trying to discourage them.
2. Recommendations
It would appear that one way to decrease the wasteful
results of competition is greater centralization of T&E project
control in AIR-06 where a greater knowledge of the overall
capabilities and workloads of the field activities exists.
However , it Is unlikely that this would work for two reasons.
First, there are insufficient personnel in AIR-06 to assume the
added responsibility and it is unlikely that additional personnel
are available. Second, this is a reduction in the flexibility
and authority of AIR-05 and would meet strong resistance from
that quarter. The best solution is probably merely to encourage
greater awareness of the problem and greater cooperation between
AIR-05 and AIR-06 through the policies established in NAVKATINST
3960.10 and NAVAIRINST 3960. 2A . Proposals have been made for
the establishment of a facilities ard capabilities handbook which
could be used to increase the awareness of all T&E facilities
users, and particularly AIR-05, of the areas of expertise of the
various T&E field activities. This would improve the situation
and such a handbook should be published.
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B. PLANNING AND BUDGETING FACILITIES IMPROVEMENTS
1. Discussion
The Uniform Funding Policy and NAVMATIN3T 3960.10
require that facilities improvements that support a specific
project be paid for by funds from that project and that general
improvements in capabilities be paid for by the MRTFB budget.
In practice it is often difficult to place a given improvement
in one category or the other. The result is that the "user"
refuses to pay to improve the overall capability of the activity
and AIR-06 refuses to pay for improvements to support a project
and needed improvements are not accomplished. Further, there
is no provision for facilities improvements which cannot be
justified by an immediate application. This precludes long
range planning and efficient modernization programs because
accurate predictions of future projects are not available.
The other difficulty with funding facilities improvements
from the MRTFB budget, mentioned earlier, is the low priority
of facilities improvements when compared with other demands for
MRTFB funds such as salaries and other operating expenses which
are relatively fixed and must be paid. When user funding falls
short of budget estimates it is the facility improvements which
inevitably suffer. Even when user funding is adequate, MRTFB
funding must be held in escrow against possible shortfalls. This
results in hurried spending at year end instead of a balanced




To alleviate these problems and allow facilities
improvements to be based on a coordinated long range plan, the
funding of facilities improvements should be exempted from the
Uniform Funding Policy and funded entirely from MRTFB funds
except when large dollar value improvements are being considered
for a specific project. In this case, "user" funding might be
used to supplement MRTFB funding. The negotiation for "user"
funding should be between AIR-06 and the program manager. The
field activities should not be involved. Further, the IScM
portion of the MRTFB budget, which funds the facilities improve-
ments, should become a separate allocation not subject to other
uses. This would result in a reduction in the flexibility of
the field activities to utilize the MRTFB funds as required but




VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations which have been made generally fall into
one of three categories; changes in operating procedure, changes
in budgetary procedure, and emphasis on implementing existing
policies. These recommendations are summarized In the sections
that follow.
A. OPERATING PROCEDURE RECOMMENDATIONS
Dialogue between users and the T&E field activities should
be increased. Field activities should be considered a part of
the NAVAIR team rather than as contractors.
A single Integrated priority system for T&E field activity
support should be established.
Detailed discussions should be held to review AIRTASKS/WCRK
UNITS and detailed program plans prior to their promulgation.
A standard format should be developed for test plans and
they should be submitted for review by the work sponsor.
Standard procedures should be developed for reporting the
results of T&E. These should be based on simplified requirements
which minimize the effort involved in preparing the report,
which would improve timeliness. A report tracking system should
be established at Headquarters to provide easy access to the
reports and status of required actions.
A study effort should be instituted which would result in
the establishment of a NAVAIR T&E information system.
63

A facilities and capabilities handbook should be prepared
to improve awareness of users of areas of expertise of the
various T&E field activities.
B. BUDGETARY PROCEDURE RECOMMENDATIONS
The requirement to obligate all RDT&EN funds within the
first year of their availability should be reexamined to determine
if it causes more harm than good.
Funding of facilities requirements, except in rare cases,
should be paid for entirely from MRTFB funding.
The I&M portion of the MRTFB budget should be a separate
allocation, not subject to other uses.
C. POLICIES WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER EMPHASIS
Users of T&E field activities should submit written fiscal
planning information to AIR-6103 per NAVMATINST 3960.IO.
Efforts for a strong I&M program should continue.
To minimize wasteful duplication of facilities and capabil-
ities and competition between T&E field activities, policies





ELEMENTS OF THE MAJOR RANGE AND TEST FACILITY BASE £s]
NAVY
Pacific Missile Test Center
Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center
Naval Air Test Center
Naval Air Propulsion Center
Naval Weapons Center
(T&E Portion Only)
Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility
AIR FORCE
Eastern Test Range
Space & Missile Test Center
Satellite Control Facility
Arnold Engineering Development Center
4950th Test Wing
Tactical Fighter Weapons Center
Flight Test Center
Armament Development and Test Center
Air Defense Weapons Center
ARMY










NOTE: The Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility is a NAVAIR T&E




DEFINITIONS OF ACQUISITION CATEGORIES Q.2]
ACAT I: Projects designated by the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) or Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEP3ECDEF) having a
nominal dollar value in excess of $75M RDT&E or $200M Production
and such other lesser programs as may be so designated by SECDEF
or DEPSECDEF.
ACAT II: Projects designated by a Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC) principal, SECNAV or CNO having a nominal
dollar value in excess of $20M RDT&E or $50M Production and such
other lesser programs as may be recommended by the Chief of
Naval Material (CHNAVMAT), CP-OSO, OP-O98 or the program sponsors
(DCNO/DMSO).
ACAT III: Projects designated by the OPNAV sponsor, having
a nominal dollar value in excess of $5M RDT&E or $20M Production
and such other lesser programs recommended by CHNAVMAT, OP-090,
OP-O98, or the DA. Programs below the ACAT III threshold will
normally be designated ACAT III if they:
(a) Directly affect the military characteristics of
ships, aircraft or other combat units;
(b) Require Operational Test and Evaluation (CT&S) to
support key program decisions; or
(c) Require Fleet RDT&E support.
ACAT IV: Projects not designated as ACAT III or higher
which meet any one of the following criteria:
(a) Have a unit cost of more than $10,000, net
including management and support costs;
(b) Have a total project cost of $1M (R&D plus
production) excluding shore based training devices and shore
support equipment not used in direct support of deployed
systems;
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